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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze the main determinants of the economic life in 
Croatian municipalities. For that purpose, we collected data related to the municipal 
budgets and business results of entrepreneurs registered in 427 municipalities during 
2007-2011 period. In order to determine and study the variations in municipal 
economic outcomes related to the size of municipalities, their administrative status 
(municipalities belonging to the areas of state national concern, hill and mountain 
areas, and island areas), their geographic location and dominant political party in 
the municipality, we apply multivariate statistics methods (Levene’s test of variance 
homogeneity, ANOVA, and Sheffe post-hoc test). The results suggest that size of the 
municipalities explains the variation related to municipal fiscal capacity and average 
net earnings of inhabitants living in municipalities. The political affiliation of a 
mayor is related to the differences in the relative amount of aid granted from the 
central government budget, fiscal capacity and indebtness, while the differences in 
administrative status of municipalities account for discrepancies observed in 
employment, average net earnings, indebtedness, central government aid, and 
expenditures for social protection. The basic conclusion of research is that Croatian 
municipalities differ significantly in the majority of the analyzed economic 
determinants and that current administrative status should be subject to the general 
local government reform, not only in special status and number of local units but 
also in fiscal equalization process. 
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1. Introduction
Croatian territory is divided into 20 counties and the capital city with the special 
status. Counties are further divided into 127 cities and 429 municipalities, whereby 
some cities and municipalities have a special administrative status as areas of special 
national concern (in the remainder of the text designated as ASNC), hill and mountain 
areas (in the remainder of the text designated as HMA) and island areas (in the 
remainder of the text designated as IA). Such level of administrative atomization in a 
relatively small country that has only 4,284,889 inhabitants (DZS, 2012), and a total 
land area of 56,594 square kilometers suggests many problems and paradoxes. 
In this paper we focus on the analysis of economic life in 427 Croatian municipalities4. 
Database built for the purpose of the research presented in this paper provides the 
following numerical description of these municipalities. Out of 427 municipalities, 
altogether 222 have a special administrative status (either ASNC, HMA or IA), thus 
suggesting that 52 percent of all municipalities are located in areas of the country 
that are either underdeveloped or potentially hindered either due to historical or 
geographical reasons. The pronounced atomization becomes apparent if we take into 
account that there are 36 municipalities which have less than 1,000 inhabitants, while 
at the same time only 53 municipalities have more than 5,000 inhabitants. In many 
cases, municipalities are too small to be able to financially sustain themselves, and 
as a consequence they could not exist without the state aid. For example, in 2011, 
in 47 municipalities central government aid accounted for more than 50 percent of 
total revenue, while at the same time 34 municipalities spent more than 70 percent 
of their total revenues on wages of municipal employees and material expenses. In 
the 2007-2011 period central government transferred altogether 3.7 billion Kuna (or 
1.1 percent of GDP in 2012) to municipalities as a central budget aid. Paradoxically, 
there were even ten municipalities in which the number of employees in municipal 
administration in 2011 surpassed the number of employees in incorporated sector in 
the same year. Obviously, in the case of Croatia, the need to have a more decentralized 
territorial and administrative division in order to be able to fully meet the needs of the 
local population is in deep collision with the basic condition of fiscally sustainable 
local government units. Thereby, the problem is not only the inadequate territorial 
division, but also the lack of fiscal autonomy that would increase the municipal fiscal 
capacity. As Bajo and Jurlina Alibegović (2008) claim, in the majority of cases, local 
government units cannot independently change the bases and rates taxes they collect, 
nor can they spend their non-tax revenues for purposes other than prescribed by the 
central government.
The main aim of this paper is to analyze the economic life of Croatian municipalities. 
Thereby, the term „economic life“ encompasses both the fiscal position and the 
4 Two municipalities (Prgomet and Marijanci) are left out of the analysis due to lack of data. For details 
please consult the fourth section of the paper. 
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fiscal sustainability represented by various municipal budget indicators, and 
entrepreneurial activity proxied by main business indicators of incorporated 
sector registered in the given municipality. In other words, we will analyze budget 
performance and the business sector performance in 427 municipalities in order to 
detect any variations in economic life that stem from differences in municipalities’ 
size, geographic position, special administrative status and political structure. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature that performs a 
statistical analysis of main economic indicators of Croatian municipalities, and one 
of the few that provides statistical analysis of local government units in Croatia 
in general. Due to diverse database collected for the purpose of this research, we 
are able to provide not only comprehensive and multifaceted analysis of various 
aspects of economic activity of local government units (including fiscal capacity, 
indebtedness, business sector performance, employment, entrepreneurship, and net 
income), but also give insights into political economy of those units.
The main hypothesis of the paper is that there is a significant economic difference 
among Croatian municipalities mainly caused by complex administrative arrangement 
and inadequate fiscal equalization system. For the purpose of testing before 
mentioned hypothesis and achieving mentioned goals, the paper is structured as 
following. After introduction, we provide an overview of an institutional framework 
of Croatian municipalities and summarize the existing literature on economic activity 
in those municipalities. The third part of the paper briefly discusses the statistical 
method applied in this paper, while the fourth part describes the main features of 
database used in the analysis. The fifth part gives an overview of the main findings 
of the statistical analysis, while the final part of the paper offers concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review
Before literature review, it is necessary to give a short analysis of normative 
framework as well as sources of financing of Croatian municipalities. Besides 
the central government level, there is a regional and a local level of government in 
Croatia, or units of local and regional self-government. Counties are units of regional 
self-government, whose main activities are related to the affairs of regional importance 
(e.g. education, health care system, physical and urban planning, infrastructure 
etc.). Cities and municipalities are units of local self-government, and they carry out 
activities with a local scope which directly tend to the needs of citizens, such as social 
care system, primary health care, primary education, culture etc. As already mentioned 
in the Introduction, Croatia has 20 counties, 127 cities and 429 municipalities. The 
capital, City of Zagreb, has a special status of both a county and a city. 
Constitution and domain of work of local units are regulated with the Act on Local 
and Regional Self-Government. Municipality is a unit of local self-government 
which is established for an area of several populated places which represent a natural, 
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economic and a social unit, and which are interconnected with common interests of 
citizens (Article 3, Act on Local and Regional Self-Government, OG 33/01, 60/01, 
106/03, 129/05, 109/07, 125/08, 36/09, 150/11, 144/12 and 19/13). Municipalities 
make up the greatest share of the total number of local self-government units.5
Economic life of municipalities is also dependent on the normative framework, which 
defines the authority and the system of (public) financing of municipalities. Sources of 
funds and financing activities in the work field of local self-government are regulated 
with the Act on the Financing Units of Local and Regional Self-Government. 
Furthermore, the Act on Budget defines planning, drafting, adopting and executing 
budgets, asset and debt management, public debt management, borrowing and 
State and local and regional units’ guarantees, budget relations in the public sector, 
accounting, budget control and other questions related to public finance management. 
This is a complex institutional framework with numerous overlaps.6 
Considering the goal of this paper, fiscal decentralization system7 affects greatly the 
economic efficiency of municipalities. Out of 23 observed variables in the study, 13 
of them are directly or indirectly generated out of fiscal data (see Table 2). Changes 
in the administrative-territorial structure were frequent and mostly based on political, 
and not on economic or administrative criteria (Čavrak, 2009: 171-172; Koprić, 2010: 
374-376). Thus, fiscal relations between the central and lower levels of government 
were conducted without a detailed and clearly set long-term strategy. Local units 
often received special status based on different criteria. This special status also affects 
the fiscal position of local units.8 
5 The number of municipalities in Croatia is large and continuously growing. In the period 1993-2012 
69 new municipalities were created (Koprić, 2010: 374). Exceptionally large number of cities and 
municipalities in Croatia represents an economic, fiscal and administrative obstacle for optimal eco-
nomic development (Ott&Bajo, 2001; Ott, 2002; Jurlina Alibegović et al., 2010; Koprić, 2010).
6 It should be mentioned that besides the basic legislation, there are numerous other acts, regulations, 
rule books, charters and other rules which regulate the area of municipalities in Croatia (e.g. forests, 
agriculture, public-private partnerships, concessions, public procurement etc.), and which are very 
important for the economic life of local units. For a quality legislation overview, see Bratić (2008: 
125-133).
7 Fiscal decentralization refers to the transfer of authority and responsibility for the provision of public 
services, from central to lower levels of Government, i.e. the transfer of authority to collect certain 
taxes and determine the allocation of collected funds in accordance with clearly set criteria (Tanzi, 
1996: 297; Litvack et al., 1998: 8).
8 Act on Regional Development (OG 159/09) form 2009 has introduced new legal and strategic frame-
work for regional development. Further, new assessment and categorization of local units in five 
groups was developed according to development index. In November 2013 Croatian Government an-
nounced and started parliament procedure for five new acts which define tax reliefs and government 
aid for less developed areas. It can be expected that form 2014 the concept of tax reliefs and financial 
aids for local units with a special status (ASNC and HMA) will be abandoned, i.e. the new concept 
according to development index will be introduced. In that way each local unit (city or municipality) 
can acquire a certain aid if it’s underdeveloped, regardless of former special or regular status.
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The local government units with special administrative status include: 185 
local units on the Area of Special National Concern (ASNC) (30 cities and 155 
municipalities), 45 local units on Hill and Mountain Areas (HMA) (12 cities and 33 
municipalities), and 50 local units on islands (15 cities and 35 municipalities) with 
signed agreement on common financing of capital projects which are of interest 
for the development of islands.9 Depending on the type of special status, this status 
enables local units different incentive measures, e.g. for demographical renewal, 
protection of the environment and education. Special status grants local units a 
preferential treatment in terms of distributing personal income tax and profit tax 
breaks. Also, municipalities make up the largest share in the total number of local 
self-government units in Croatia with a special status.
As previously mentioned, local units with special status have a favored position 
when it comes to the distribution of personal income tax as shared tax. Table 1 
shows the allocation of personal income tax for the period 2007–2011. Personal 
income tax is the basic instrument of (vertical) fiscal equalization in Croatia. 
Another type of tax distributed between central and local government is real 
property transfer tax (in the ratio 40:60). These taxes make up over 90% of tax 
revenues, which is approximately 60 percent of total revenues of municipalities in 
Croatia in the observed period (Ministry of Finance, 2013). It can be concluded 
from the latter that the fiscal position of municipalities in Croatia is greatly affected 
by own tax revenues which are primarily reflected through the personal income tax, 
and indirectly through the number of employed residents in the area. 
Besides the distribution of tax revenue, (horizontal) fiscal equalization is conducted 
through aid from the Central Government. Both current and capital aids are in 
average always less than 10% of total local units’ revenue (Ministry of Finance, 
2013). When analyzing the central government aid distribution, Primorac (2013) 
concludes that it plays a significant role in accomplishing goals of regional politics, 
as opposed to fiscal equalization policy.
It is important to emphasize that the profit tax was also a shared tax, i.e. an 
instrument of fiscal equalization, however, from 2007 on, profit tax belongs 
exclusively to Central Government’s budget. In order to avoid losses in ASNC and 
HMA on this basis, according to the Act on Execution of Government Budget10, 
this amount is redeemed through central government aids. Generally speaking, Act 
on Execution of Government Budget for an individual fiscal year defines aid to all 
local units, as well as the criteria for the calculation and distribution of grant from 
9 Act on Areas of Special National Concern (OG 86/08, 57/11 and 51A/13) and Act on Hill and Moun-
tain Areas (OG 12/02, 32/02, 117/03, 42/05, 90/05 and 80/08). The City of Zagreb as the capital has 
the special status as well. 
10 Act on Execution of Government Budget is passed for every fiscal year. In case of an amending bud-
get, the Act is supplemented throughout the year. 
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the Government budget to the units of the first and the second group of ASNC (for 
more detail, see Bronić, 2008 and 2010). 
Table 1: Distribution of personal income tax revenues in the period 2007–2011.* 
– in %
Distribution of PIT 
revenue 
Standard distribution Islands** ASNC and 
HMA*** 
(2007–2011)
1.1.2007–
1.7.2008
1.7.2008–
2011
1.1.2007–
1.7.2008
1.7.2008–
2011
Central government – – – – –
County 15.0 15.5 15.0 15.5 10.0
City/municipality 52.0 55.0 52.0 55.0 90.0
Decentralized 
functions
12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 –
Equalization fund 21.0 17.5 – – –
Common capital 
projects
– – 21.0 17.5 –
Note: * On 1 March 2012 new changes in the personal income tax distribution have been made 
for all local units except for ASNC and HMA. Furthermore, the Table shows data only 
related to municipalities. Thus, the City of Zagreb, which also has the special status, 
has been deliberately left out.; ** Local units on islands with an agreement on common 
financing of capital projects which are of interest for the development of islands.; 
*** ASNC – Areas of Special National Concern, HMA – Hill and Mountain Areas.
Source: Authors according to the Act on the Financing Units of Local and Regional Self-
Government, OG 117/93, 69/97, 33/00, 73/00, 127/00, 59/01, 107/01, 117/01-correction, 
150/02, 147/03, 132/06, 26/07, 73/08 and 25/12
The goal of this paper was to examine economic life of municipalities. Economic 
life is defined as the fiscal efficiency of municipality and the business efficiency 
of entrepreneurs who do business in that municipality. Nature of the impact of 
ruling political parties on the economic outcomes in the municipalities, as well 
the impact of various municipal administrative status on those outcomes are also 
the subject of this analysis. In that context, what follows is literature overview, 
foremost of the empirical research in Croatia dealing with the aforementioned 
topics.
Although analytical background for measuring economic effects of fiscal 
decentralization is rather large (e.g. Scott 2009; Huther i Shah, 1998), empirical 
studies on this topic in Croatia are relatively scarce. As far as we are aware, there 
is only one paper that uses methods of inferential statistics on the efficiency 
analysis in Croatia. Rašić Bakarić et al. (2014) conducted a statistical analysis 
of basic efficiency indicators of Croatian cities. Analysis was conducted on a 
sample of 127 Croatian cities, and equal importance was given to the evaluation 
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of efficiency of city self-governments and the efficiency of entrepreneurs doing 
business in those cities. Differences in economic efficiency due to city size and 
location of the municipality in greater geographical regions are especially carefully 
examined. Besides that, the impact of ruling political parties on the outcome of 
economic processes is also analyzed. Results of the analysis show statistically 
significant differences in the economic efficiency of cities. There are especially 
large discrepancies in the economic efficiency of large and small cities, as well as 
between North-Western Croatian cities and the rest of the country. 
Other empirical research is mostly concerned with the problem of fiscal 
equalization. Bajo and Bronić (2007) examine the existing model of fiscal 
equalization on a sample of 5% of the population of cities and municipalities in 
2004, and conclude that the existing system of fiscal equalization does not lower 
fiscal inequalities that exist between cities and municipalities. Bronić (2010) 
made similar conclusions, by examining the aid system for counties in 2005. 
Besides aforementioned empirical papers, there is a significant number of mostly 
reviews dealing with the broader aspect of local finance and local budget (e.g. Ott 
& Bajo, 2001), questions of fiscal relations between certain levels of government 
(e.g. Jurlina Alibegović, 2006), questions of local borrowing (e.g. Drezgić, 2004; 
Primorac, 2011), questions of transfer of authority, responsibility and funds onto 
units of local and regional self-government (Ott et al. 2002; Jurlina Alibegović et 
al. 2010; Petak, 2012). 
Not many papers dealing with the topic of efficiency of entrepreneurs on a local level 
have been found in the Croatian literature. Marković et al. (2013) have analyzed 
the performance of enterprises entitled to tax relief in the ASNC and provided an 
overview of financial resources (tax revenue) which state authorities have waived 
to facilitate a more competitive business performance. Stojčić (2012) finds positive 
and significant relationship between export intensity and the firms’ location in small 
urban areas or free trade zones. There is a set of papers dealing with regional or local 
economic development (see Čavrak, 2009), but they exclude the analysis of business 
activities of entrepreneurs on this level. Čavrak (2004) includes the results from a 
field study based on questioners about the characteristics of entrepreneurial capacities 
in ASNC. Results of the research point to deficit of local ‘entrepreneurial capacities’, 
i.e. the lack of human resources and entrepreneurial climate in ASNC. That points to 
unequal entrepreneurial chances in relation to other parts of Croatia. There are certain 
papers offering suggestions on the statistical framework for regional development 
assessment in Croatia, as well as the selection of arguments for measuring regional 
(under)development (Cziraky, 2005; Puljiz, 2009).
Literature offers several papers partially dealing with the effect of ruling political 
parties on the outcome of economic processes in local units. Bratić (2008) analyzed 
the decision-making process in local budgets in Croatia, by questioning local 
councilors and interviewing competent authorities of local government in Croatia. 
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It can be concluded from the results that the executive local power plays the greatest 
role in the adoption of local budgets, whereas the role of representative government 
is weak. Research does not point to differences in budget (fiscal) variables in 
relation to certain ruling parties. However, there are two studies on political-budget 
cycles on a city and county level in Croatia (Mačkić 2013 and 2014). Both studies 
confirm the existence of opportunity business-budget cycles in the observed cities 
and counties in Croatia. 
3. Methodology 
The aim of the statistical analysis conducted in this paper is to determine whether 
the variation of economic outcomes in Croatian municipalities is determined by 
the size of the municipality, its geographic location, its administrative status, and 
the political party of a municipality’s mayor. In order to test these assumptions we 
use the Levene’s test for variance homogeneity, one-way analysis of the variance 
(ANOVA) or t-test and the Scheffe post hoc test.
The empirical analysis is divided into four segments. In the first segment we test the 
differences in mean values of variables representing several aspects of economic 
life in municipalities which can be attributed to the differences in the size of the 
municipalities. We consider the municipalities with 2,500 inhabitants or less as 
small municipalities. On the other hand, municipalities with 5,000 inhabitants 
or more are assumed to be large, while municipalities that have more than 2,500 
and less than 5,000 inhabitants are considered medium size municipalities. In the 
second segment we test the variation of economic outcomes in municipalities 
which may stem from the difference in its administrative status. Thereby, we 
differentiate between four groups: ASNC municipalities, HMA municipalities, IA 
municipalities, and municipalities without the special administrative status. The 
third segment of the analysis investigates the relationship between the political 
structure and economic activities in municipalities. By political structure we assume 
the political party to which a mayor of the municipality belongs to. We differentiate 
four different political parties or party groups: Croatian Democratic Union (CDU), 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), regional parties, and other parties. The last 
segment of the statistical analysis assesses the influence of geographic location of 
municipalities on the variation in basic economic municipal indicators. Thereby, we 
define two geographical regions; Adriatic Croatia and Continental Croatia, as these 
regions correspond to the current NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial 
units for statistics). 
The univariate test procedures of ANOVA and t-test are appropriate when the 
following basic assumptions are met: the distributions of the populations from 
which the samples are selected are normal and the variances of the distributions in 
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the populations are equal (the assumption of homogeneity of variance) (Aczel and 
Sounderpandian, 2009.). As this analysis is conducted on a sample size larger than 
30 cases (427 Croatian municipalities), the normality does not need to be tested. 
In other words, as long as the sample is based on 30 or more observations, the 
sampling distribution of the mean can be safely assumed to be normal11 (Bahovec 
and Erjavec, 2009.). Leven’s test is used for testing the hypothesis that the variances 
in the groups are equal. If Leven’s test shows that the variances are roughly equal 
(p>0.05, null-hypothesis is accepted), the one-way ANOVA (or t-test) with post-hoc 
comparisons can be estimated (Coakes, 2005). 
4. Data and empirical analysis
In order to analyze the economic activity in Croatian municipalities, it is necessary 
to bring together and combine several data sets because we are interested in 
several dimensions of economic life of municipalities, with each dimension being 
represented in a separate data set. Namely, for all municipalities under the analysis 
we obtained data on the realization of the municipal budget, number of employees 
in municipal administration, entrepreneurial business results and employment in 
incorporated sector, number of inhabitants residing in a given municipality, average 
net wage in incorporated sector and crafts and free-lance professions, and the 
political party of the major of the municipality. Indicators related to the realization 
of municipal budgets and the data on the number of employees in municipal 
administration are taken from the data base on realization of the local government 
units´ budgets compiled and published by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic 
of Croatia (Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia, 2013). Data related 
to average net wages comes from the Croatian Tax Authority. Basic business 
performance indicators of entrepreneurs registered in individual municipalities are 
collected, compiled and published by Financial Agency (Financial Agency, 2013). 
That data set contains the following business indicators: total revenues, number 
of entrepreneurs, number of employees, and net profit for each municipality for 
any given year. The data on the number of inhabitants in municipalities are taken 
from Croatian Census (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012), while the data on the 
politically party of the municipalities´ mayor are obtained through the internet 
search. 
Out of altogether 429 municipalities in Croatia, our data set entails 427 of them. 
Two municipalities (Prgomet and Marijanci) are excluded from the analysis 
because they are not covered in data compilation process of the Financial Agency, 
11 It stems from Central Limit Theorem which says that given random and independent samples of N 
observations each, the distribution of sample means approaches normality as the size of N increases, 
regardless of the shape of the population distribution. 
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which means that for those two municipalities there are no available data on 
entrepreneurial business performance. We use altogether 22 variables which are 
constructed from the indicators available in our conjoined database. The source 
and the manner of calculation of the variables are explained in Table 2. 
Table 2:  The description of dependent variables 
The name of the 
variable
Variable definition
Data 
sources
Data range
Mean 
value
Standard 
deviation
Population Number of inhabitants of the 
municipality 
CBS 2007–2011 2,960.7 1,985.5
Entrepreneurial 
revenue per 
employee
Average per capita revenue 
of all enterprises registered in 
the municipality divided by 
the average number of persons 
in paid employment, in the 
period 2007–2011, (expressed 
in thousands HRK)
FINA 2007–2011 505.5 291.4
Entrepreneurial 
revenue per 
inhabitant
Average per capita annual 
revenue of all enterprises 
registered in the municipality, 
in the period 2007–2011, 
(expressed in thousands HRK)
FINA and 
CBS
2007–2011 41.0 63.5
Entrepreneurship Average per capita number 
of legal entities registered in 
the municipality, in the period 
2007–2011 
FINA and 
CBS
2007–2011 1.2 1.2
Employment 
in incorporated 
sector
Average number of persons in 
paid employment in the period 
2007–2011 expressed as a 
share of the population of the 
municipality, (%)
FINA and 
CBS
2007–2011 7.9 9.0
Net profit Average net profit of legal 
entities registered in the 
municipality divided by the 
average number of enterprises, 
in the period 2007–2011, 
(expressed in thousands HRK)
FINA 2007–2011 0.6 0.5
Net profit – 
dummy variable
1= average net profit in the 
period 2007–2011 positive;  
0= average net profit in the 
period 2007–2011, negative
FINA 2007–2011 – –
Average 
net wage in 
incorporated 
sector
Average monthly net wage 
received by an inhabitant of a 
given municipality employed 
in incorporated sector, 
(expressed in HRK) 
Croatian 
Tax 
Authority
2007–2011 3.398 489
Ivana Rašić Bakarić et al. • The inquiry into the economic life of Croatian municipalities 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2014 • vol. 32 • sv. 2 • 285-312 295
The name of the 
variable
Variable definition
Data 
sources
Data range
Mean 
value
Standard 
deviation
Average net 
wage in crafts 
and free-lance 
professions
Average monthly net wage 
received by an inhabitant of a 
given municipality employed 
in a craft or working in a free-
lance profession (expressed in 
HRK)
Croatian 
Tax 
Authority
2007–2011 3.335 841
Budget balance Total average municipal 
budget revenues minus total 
average municipal budget 
expenditures in the period 
2007–2011, (as % of total 
average revenues) 
Ministry 
of Finance
2017–2011 0.3 13.0
Budget balance – 
dummy variable
1= average budget balance 
in the period 2007–2011, 
positive; 0= average budget 
balance in the period  
2007–2011, negative
Ministry 
of Finance
2007–2011 – –
Indebtedness Total receipts from borrowing 
in the period 2002–2011 (as % 
of total average revenues)
Ministry 
of Finance
2002–2011 13.0 23.1
Indebtedness –
dummy variable
1 = municipality was 
borrowing money in the period 
2002-2011; 1 = municipality 
wasn’t borrowing money in the 
period 2002–2011
Ministry 
of Finance
2002–2011 – –
Central 
government aid
Average share of central 
government grants expressed 
as a share of the municipality’s 
own revenues, (%)
Ministry 
of Finance
2007–2011 27.9 17.9
Tax revenues Average tax revenues 
expressed as a share of the 
total municipality’s budget 
revenues, in the period 
2007–2011, (%)
Ministry 
of Finance
2007–2011 43.7 16.5
Subsidies Average expenditures for 
subsidies expressed as a share 
of the total expenditures of the 
municipal budget in the period 
2007–2011, (%) 
Ministry 
of Finance
2007–2011 1.5 3.3
Employment 
in municipal 
administration
Average share of employment 
in the local government bodies 
in the total number of persons 
in paid employment, in the 
period 2007–2011, (%)
Ministry 
of Finance
2007–2011 14.4 26.7
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The name of the 
variable
Variable definition
Data 
sources
Data range
Mean 
value
Standard 
deviation
Expenditures for 
employees and 
material costs
Average expenditures for 
material and labour costs 
expressed as a share of the 
total budgetary expenditures, 
in the period 2007–2011, (%)
Ministry 
of Finance
2007–2011 48.2 14.8
Expenditures for 
housing
Average per capita 
expenditures for housing, 
in the period 2007–2011, 
(expressed in thousands HRK)
Ministry 
of Finance 
and CBS
2007–2011 769.3 845.8
Expenditures for 
environmental 
protection
Average per capita 
expenditures for environmental 
protection, in the period 
2007–2011, (expressed 
in thousands HRK)
Ministry 
of Finance 
and CBS
2007–2011 192.8 354.5
Expenditures for 
education
Average per capita 
expenditures for education, 
in the period 2007–2011, 
(expressed in thousands HRK)
Ministry 
of Finance 
and CBS
2007–2011 228.3 263.1
Expenditures for 
religion, culture 
and recreation
Average per capita 
expenditures for religion, 
culture and recreation, in the 
period 2007–2011, (expressed 
in thousands HRK)
Ministry 
of Finance 
and CBS
2007–2011 232.8 316.0
Expenditures for 
social protection
Average per capita 
expenditures for social 
protection, in the period 
2007–2011, (expressed 
in thousands HRK)
Ministry 
of Finance 
and CBS
2007–2011 136.4 147.4
Source: Authors
All variables except Indebtedness are given as averages for the 2007-2011period, 
while Indebtedness is a sum of total debt accumulated during 2002-2011 period. 
We decided to average indicators in order to smooth out their pronounced variation 
across time and thus obtain a more representative indicator of economic and fiscal 
performance of individual municipalities. We must also note that three variables 
are dummy variables which 0 and 1 values refer to having a deficit or surplus 
(Budget balance), having net loss or net profit (Profitability), or not being able 
to borrow money or being able to borrow money (Indebtedness). Incorporating 
dummy variables into the analysis is another way to deal with pronounced 
variation of average values of variables across municipalities (this variation is 
clearly evident when observing mean and standard deviation values of variables 
presented in Table 2). 
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5. Results and discussion
As mentioned above, the empirical analysis is divided into four separate segments. 
This study applies one-way ANOVA (or t-test)12 and the Scheffe’s post hoc test 
in order to detect any variations in economic life of municipalities that stem from 
differences in their size, geographic position, special administrative status and 
political structure. Prior to ANOVA test, the Levene’s test for equality of variances 
is performed, in order to assess variance homogeneity, which is a precondition for 
parametric tests such as the t-test and ANOVA. The results of the Levene’s test are 
presented in the Appendix. ANOVA (or t-test) is conducted only for the variables for 
which equal variance assumption of the observed groups was met. In addition, one 
has to note that only statistically significant results of estimated tests are presented. 
Table 3:  One-way ANOVA and t-test 
Variable
Municipality 
by size
Special 
administrative
status
Political party 
of the Mayor
Region
df F df F df F df t
Population – – 3 4.791* – – 425 3,565*
Central government aid – – 3 43.491* 3 10.238* – –
Indebtedness – dummy 
variable
– – 3 2.754** – – – –
Expenditures for social 
protection per inhabitant
– – 3 4.658** – –
Employment in incorporated 
sector
– – 3 5.242* – – 425 -2,844*
Entrepreneurial revenue per 
inhabitant
– – – – – – 425 -2,097**
Tax revenues 2 21.571* – – 3 3.840* – –
Indebtedness – – – – 3 2.802** – –
Net wage in incorporated 
sector
2 6.359* 3 19.341* 3 9.400* – –
Note: *significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level of significance.
Source: Authors’ calculation
In the first segment of the analysis the variation in variables representing municipal 
economic life which can be attributed to variation in the size of the municipalities 
was tested. Table 3 contains the results of this analysis.  
12 As the t-test is limited to comparing means of two groups and one-way ANOVA can compare more 
than two groups, the t-test is considered as a special case of one-way ANOVA. 
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Table 4:  Results of post-hoc Scheffe test
Variable Group Type of municipality
Mean 
difference
Std. Err. sig.
Tax revenues
Small
Medium -7.42* 1.7 0.000
Large -14.18* 2.4 0.000
Medium
Small 7.42* 1.7 0.000
Large -6.75** 2.5 0.027
Net wage in 
incorporated sector
Large
Small 263.60* 74.0 0.002
Medium 206.10** 76.9 0.028
Population Without 
special 
status
ASNC 634.08** 208.9 0.028
HMA 422.99 367.5 0.723
Islands 1056.57* 358.3 0.035
Employment in 
incorporated sector ASNC
HMA -3.0 1.7 0.361
Islands -6.1* 1.7 0.004
Without special status -2.2 0.9 0.134
Indebtedness – 
dummy variable ASNC
HMA -0.1 0.1 0.669
Islands -0.1 0.1 0.934
Without special status -0.15** 0.1 0.047
Central government 
aid ASNC
HMA 9.28** 3.0 0.024
Islands 17.75* 2.9 0.000
Without special status 18.57* 1.7 0.000
HMA
ASNC -9.28** 3.0 0.024
Islands 8.5 3.8 0.177
Without special status 9.29** 2.9 0.020
Expenditures for 
social protection per 
inhabitant
ASNC
HMA -12.2 27.9 0.979
Islands -8.9 27.2 0.991
Without special status 48.97** 15.5 0.020
Net wage in 
incorporated sector ASNC
HMA -578.65* 88.3 0.000
Islands -280.35** 86.2 0.015
Without special status -275.87* 49.1 0.000
HMA
ASNC 578.65* 88.3 0.000
Islands 298.3 111.7 0.069
Without special status 302.78* 86.4 0.007
Central Government 
Aid
CDU SDP 11.07* 2.6 0.000
Regional parties 13.99* 3.7 0.003
Other parties 5.50 2.0 0.060
Tax revenues SDP CDU 7.31** 2.4 0.029
Regional parties 8.77 4.0 0.185
Other parties 8.66* 2.7 0.017
Indebtedness CDU SDP -9.23 3.4 0.063
Regional parties 3.18 4.9 0.936
Other parties -1.63 2.7 0.945
Net wage in 
incorporated sector
CDU SDP -210.38* 70.5 0.032
Regional parties -482.77* 101.8 0.000
Other parties -64.33 55.3 0.716
Regional 
parties
SDP 272.38 116.0 0.139
CDU 482.77* 101.8 0.000
Other parties 418.43* 107.4 0.002
Note: *significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level of significance.
Source: Authors’ calculation
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The obtained results indicate that there is significant difference in the share of 
tax revenues in the municipality’s budget revenues and in the net wages paid in 
incorporated sector across the different size of municipality. In a one-way ANOVA, 
a significant F value indicates that there are differences in the means, but it does not 
tell us where those differences are. In order to detect the differences one has to apply 
the post-hoc analysis13, i.e. the Scheffe test.14 The statistically significant results of 
the Scheffe test are shown in the Table 4. For each pair of groups the difference 
between groups means is displayed, the standard error of that difference and the 
significance level of that difference. The results indicate that small municipalities 
have statistically lower tax revenues share in total revenues when compared to 
medium and large size municipalities. Also medium size municipalities have 
statistically lower tax revenue compared to large municipalities (for descriptive 
statistics by groups see Table 5). The difference is particularly striking when 
comparing the ratio of tax revenues for small and large municipalities, as the 
difference is 14.2 percent in favor of large municipalities. This difference suggests 
that smaller municipalities have significantly lower fiscal capacities when compared 
to large municipalities. However, it is interesting to note that although their fiscal 
capacity is lower, small municipalities do not differ from other municipalities in 
terms of budget balance, indebtedness or central government aid.
Regarding net earnings of municipality inhabitants in Croatia, results of the 
Scheffe test show that the average net wage paid in incorporated sector in 
large municipalities is statistically different (higher) than net earnings paid for 
employees in incorporated sector living in small municipalities and medium size 
municipalities. This result undoubtedly detects one of the sources for differences 
in tax revenues between municipalities of different size, as income tax is a main 
source of municipal budget income. Moreover, since average net wage in large 
municipalities is on average 8 percent higher when compared to small municipality, 
one can also conclude that small municipalities are on average economically more 
underdeveloped, while their inhabitants potentially more exposed to poverty. 
13 Post hoc tests are designed to compare all different combinations of the treatment groups.
14 Sheffe test is usually used with unequal sample size, which is the case with this data set (Jones, J., 
2009). Concepts of Statistics – Scheffe’ and Tukey Tests. [Report]. Richmond, Virginia, Richmond 
Community College. URL: http://people.richland.edu/james/lecture/m170/ch13-dif.html [August 
13, 2012].
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Table 5: D
escriptive statistics of the variables by groups of m
unicipalities (arithm
etic m
eans by groups of m
unicipalities)
G
roup
Type of 
m
unicipality
N
P
opulation
Indebtedness
(%
)  
Tax 
revenues
(%
)
C
entral 
governm
ent 
aid (%
)
E
xpenditures 
for social 
protection per 
inhabitant
(000 K
una)
E
m
ploym
ent 
in 
incorporated 
sector (%
)
E
ntrepreneurial 
revenue per 
inhabitant
(000 H
R
K
)
N
et w
age in 
incorporated 
sector
(H
R
K
)
S
ize
S
m
all
219
–
–
39.2 
(16.49)
–
–
–
–
3,344.8  
(478.7)
M
edium
155
–
–
46.6 
(15.4)
–
–
–
–
3,402.3  
(488.8)
L
arge
53
–
–
53.4
(13.2)
–
–
–
–
3,608.4  
(484.7)
S
pecial 
status
A
S
N
C
154
2,674.6  
(1.619.3)
–
–
39.0
 (17.1)
158.2
 (174.2)
6.07
(9.8)
–
3,198.2
 (480.8)
H
M
A
33
2,885.7  
(2.252.4)
–
–
29.7
 (15.1)
170.4
 (113.1)
9.12 
(7.78)
–
3,776.9
 (526.2)
Island
35
2,.252.1  
(2.358.5)
–
–
21.3 
(16.3)
167.1
 (129.8)
12.2
 (7.9)
–
3,478.6
(446.3)
W
ithout
special status
205
3,308.7  
(2.066.7)
–
–
20.4 
(14.4)
109.2
 (127.6)
8.3 
(8.3)
–
3,474.1
 (435.1)
P
olitical 
party
S
D
P
56
–
20.8 
(26.5)
50.4 
(13.5)
20.5
 (15.1)
–
–
–
3,537.9
 (513.8)
C
D
U
 
240
–
11.6
 (22.6)
43.1 
(17.3)
31.5 
(17.3)
–
–
–
3,327.5
 (445.1)
R
egional parties
24
–
8.4 
(14.0)
41.7
 (14.8)
17.5
 (12.7)
–
–
–
3,810.3
 (564.7)
O
ther political 
parties
107
–
13.2
 (23.1)
41.8
 (15.6)
26.0
 (18.9)
–
–
–
3,391.8
 (498.7)
R
egion
A
driatic C
roatia
268
2,522.0
(2.014.1)
–
–
–
–
9.5
 (7.2)
49.3 
(54.9)
–
C
ontinental 
C
roatia
159
3,221.1 
(1.925.1) 
–
–
–
–
6.9
 (9.7)
36.1
 (67.6)
–
N
ote: standard deviation in parenthesis. D
um
m
y variable is excluded. 
S
ource: A
uthors’ calculation
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In the second segment of our analysis, we test the variation of economic outcomes 
in municipalities which may stem from the difference in its administrative status. 
As mentioned above, there are four groups of municipalities: municipalities with 
ASNC, HMA, IA and municipalities without the special administrative status. 
Results of the one way ANOVA (see Table 2) show that there are significant 
differences in six variables across the four types of administrative status of 
municipalities: number of inhabitants, central government aid, indebtedness, 
employment in incorporated sector, the amount of social protection expenditures 
per inhabitant, and average net wages in incorporated sector. 
In the next step, we carry out post hoc Scheffe test to compare all groups with 
each other. We found a significant difference in favor of municipalities without 
special administrative status considering the number of inhabitants. The group of 
municipalities without special status has been found to have statistically larger 
population size than the group of ASNC municipalities and the group of island 
municipalities. 
In addition, the Scheffe test results shows that there is a significant difference in 
favor of IA when compared to ASNC in relation to the employment in incorporated 
sector. In fact, IA municipalities exhibit the highest share of employed persons in 
total population when compared to other groups of municipalities probably due to 
tourism related activities. Statistical differences between other municipality groups 
related to incorporated employment were not found. Indebtedness of municipality 
was measured by a dummy variable, so there are two groups of municipalities, 
municipalities being able to borrow money, and municipalities not being able 
to borrow money. Results suggest ASNC municipalities have statistically 
lower capacity to borrow additional funds than municipalities without special 
administrative status. However, no statistically significant differences were found 
among other groups of municipalities. 
The most interesting results were obtained for the variation of central government 
aid across municipalities with different administrative status. As illustrated in 
Table 3, amount of received central government aid varies significantly depending 
on special administrative status of the municipality. As indicated by the Scheffe 
test results, ASNC are more dependent on government aid than the HMA, the 
IA municipalities, and municipalities without special status. This result should 
not come as a surprise when considering the fact that ASNC municipalities on 
average receive the highest amount of aid (39 percent of their own revenues), 
while municipalities without the special status receive the lowest amount of aid 
(20 percent of their own revenues). Scheffe test results also indicate that the HMA 
municipalities are more dependent on central government aid than the group of 
municipalities without special status.
Regarding expenditures for social protections, the ASNC municipalities have 
significantly higher level of those expenditures than the group of municipalities 
Ivana Rašić Bakarić et al. • The inquiry into the economic life of Croatian municipalities 
302 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2014 • vol. 32 • sv. 2 • 285-312
without special administrative status (p<0.05). There aren’t found statistical 
differences across other three municipality groups for social protection 
expenditures. This in turn means that ASNC municipalities are more successful than 
HMA municipalities in alleviating the effects of poverty which is more prevalent in 
those areas. The analysis of the variation of net wages across municipalities related 
to the difference in their administrative status suggests that net wages in ASNC are 
statistically lower when compared to municipalities without special administrative 
status, HMA, and IA municipalities. Additionally, net wages in HMA municipalities 
are statistically higher than net wages in municipalities without special status 
(the wage difference is 9 percent in favor of HMA). This result, coupled with 
the fact that average employment in HMA is higher when compared to ASNC 
and municipalities without special administrative status, suggests one of the two 
following conclusions. Either tax benefits related to HMA status (profit tax breaks) 
had a positive effect on entrepreneurial activity in HMA municipalities, thus 
resulting in higher employment and wages, or HMA municipalities in effect do not 
need the special administrative status.
In the third segment of the empirical analysis we examine how economic 
performance in Croatian municipalities may vary in relation to the political 
party to which a mayor of the municipality belongs to. According to the one-
way ANOVA the statistically significant differences across four groups of 
municipalities were found with the following variables: central government 
aid, tax revenues, indebtedness, and net wages (see Table 3). The results of the 
Scheffe test (see Table 4) show that the municipalities whose mayor is a member 
of the CDU have statistically higher share of governmental aid in municipal 
revenues than the municipalities whose mayor belongs to the SDP, regional 
party or to other political parties. The obtained results also indicate that there is 
significant difference in the share of tax revenues in the municipality’s budget 
revenues across political affiliation of a mayor. The municipalities whose 
mayor is a member of the SDP were found to have statistically higher share 
of tax revenues in local budget revenues than the municipalities whose mayor 
is a member of the CDU or other political parties. As illustrated in Table 3, 
municipality indebtedness also varies significantly depending on the political 
affiliation of the mayor. Namely, municipalities whose mayor belongs to the SDP 
have higher level of debt than the municipalities whose mayor is a member of the 
CDU. In addition, the group of municipalities whose mayor belongs to the CDU 
has been found to have statistically lower net wages paid in incorporated, when 
compared to municipalities whose mayor belongs to SDP and regional political 
parties. This could suggest that voters in more underdeveloped municipalities on 
average prefer the CDU to other political parties. Moreover, municipalities whose 
mayor belongs to the regional parties have higher level of net earnings paid in 
incorporated sector than the municipalities whose mayor is a member of CDU or 
of other political parties.
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In the fourth part of the empirical analysis we test the variation of economic 
outcomes in municipalities which may stem from the difference in its geographic 
position. Results of the t-test show that there a significant difference in favor 
of municipalities located in Adriatic Croatia considering the employment in 
incorporated sector (p<0.01) and the entrepreneurial revenue per inhabitant 
(p<0.05). On the other hand municipalities located in Continental Croatia have been 
found to have statistically larger population size than municipalities from Adriatic 
Croatia (p<0.01). No other differences which stem from wider geographical 
location of municipalities emerge. 
6. Conclusion
The results indeed suggest that Croatian municipalities differ significantly in 
terms of their fiscal capacity, distribution of central government aid, indebtedness, 
employment, and average net wage paid to municipal inhabitants. The results 
suggest that the large municipalities have higher fiscal capacity, measured by the 
ratio of tax revenues in total municipal revenues, when compared to other groups of 
municipalities. This result suggest that a reform of local government units focused 
on more cost effective and fiscally sustainable administrative division, should 
encompass the enlargement of current municipalities, as this enlargement would 
inevitably increase their fiscal capacity and autonomy. The analysis also showed 
that the part of the difference in fiscal capacity of municipalities of various size 
stems from the variation in the net wage level in those municipalities. Further, the 
political affiliation of a mayor is related to the differences in the relative amount of 
aid granted from the central government budget, fiscal capacity and indebtedness, 
while the differences in administrative status of municipalities account for 
discrepancies observed in employment, average net earnings, indebtedness, central 
government aid, and expenditures for social protection. There are interesting 
findings regarding the variation of the central government aid granted to 
municipalities. Particular ASNC and HMA statistically differ in terms of received 
aid when compared to other municipalities and between themselves. Thereby, 
ASNC municipalities receive the highest amount of aid, which is in relative terms 
double in size when compared to municipalities without special administrative 
status. To resolve mentioned problems and diversities, a general local government 
reform and the reform of fiscal equalization process should be conducted more 
in favor of general approach, abandoning special statuses and aimed more to 
equalization of fiscal needs not fiscal capacities.
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Analiza ekonomskog života hrvatskih općina
Ivana Rašić Bakarić1, Hrvoje Šimović2, Maruška Vizek3
Sažetak
Cilj ovog članka je analizirati temeljne sastavnice ekonomskog života u hrvatskim 
općinama. U svrhu izrade analize prikupljena je baza podataka za 427 općine koja 
sadrži podatke o izvršenju proračuna općina i poslovanju poduzetnika registriranih 
u općinama u razdoblju od 2007. do 2011. U analizi se koriste metode 
multivarijantne statistike (Levenov test homogenosti varijance, ANOVA i Sheffeov 
post-hoc test), kako bi se utvrdile i proučile razlike u ekonomskim rezultatima koje 
nastaju zbog veličine općina, administrativnog statusa općine (općine koje 
potpadaju u područja posebne državne skrbi, brdsko planinska područja, otočna 
područja naspram općinama koje taj status nemaju), pripadnosti općine većim 
administrativnim jedinicama i regijama te stranačke pripadnosti načelnika općine. 
Rezultati analize sugeriraju da veličina općina objašnjava varijaciju u fiskalnom 
kapacitetu općina i prosječnoj plaći zaposlenih koji žive u općinama. Politička 
pripadnost načelnika općina povezana je s razlikama u primljenoj pomoći od 
središnje države, zaduženosti, i fiskalnog kapaciteta, dok posebni administrativni 
status općina objašnjava odstupanja u razini zaposlenosti, prosječne neto plaće, 
državne pomoći i rashoda za socijalnu zaštitu općina. Osnovni zaključak rada je 
da se hrvatske općine značajno razlikuju u većini promatranih ekonomskih 
pokazatelja te da bi postojeći administrativni status trebao biti predmetom opće 
reforme lokalne samouprave, ne samo u pogledu posebnih statusa i broja lokalnih 
jedinica nego i u pogledu procesa fiskalnog izravnanja.
Ključne riječi: jedinice lokalne samouprave, općine, analiza varijance, podu zet ništvo
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Appendix
Table A1: Levene’s test* of equality of error variances, municipalities by size
Variable F df1 df2 Sig.
Population 79.469 2 424 0.000
Entrepreneurial revenue per employee 2.110 2 424 0.123
Entrepreneurial revenue per inhabitant 0.028 2 424 0.973
Entrepreneurship 8.667 2 424 0.000
Employment to population ratio incorporated sector 0.289 2 424 0.750
Net profit 13.886 2 424 0.000
Net profit - dummy variable 0.905 2 424 0.405
Budget balance 1.597 2 424 0.204
Budget balance – dummy variable 0.671 2 424 0.512
Indebtedness 6.095 2 424 0.002
Indebtedness – dummy variable 0.604 2 424 0.547
Net wages in incorporated sector 0.336 2 424 0.715
Net wages in crafts 2.387 2 424 0.093
Central government grants 7.942 2 424 0.000
Tax revenues 1.584 2 424 0.206
Subsidies 5.730 2 424 0.004
Employment in municipal administration 10.742 2 424 0.000
Expenditures for employees and material costs 6.791 2 424 0.001
Expenditures for housing 6.586 2 424 0.002
Expenditures for environmental protection 10.029 2 424 0.000
Expenditures for education 1.761 2 424 0.173
Expenditures for religion, culture and recreation 4.077 2 424 0.018
Expenditures for social protection 1.788 2 424 0.169
Note: *Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across 
groups.
Source: Authors calculation
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Table A2: Levene’s test of equality of error variances, municipalities by special 
administrative status
Variable F df1 df2 Sig.
Population 1.465 3 423 0.224
Entrepreneurial revenue per employee 4.387 3 423 0.005
Entrepreneurial revenue per inhabitant 1.759 3 423 0.154
Entrepreneurship 4.272 3 423 0.005
Employment to population ratio incorporated sector 0.638 3 423 0.591
Net profit 0.850 3 423 0.467
Net profit - dummy variable 1.768 3 423 0.153
Budget balance 2.894 3 423 0.035
Budget balance – dummy variable 4.316 3 423 0.005
Indebtedness 4.799 3 423 0.003
Indebtedness – dummy variable 2.133 3 423 0.095
Net wages in incorporated sector 0.308 3 423 0.819
Net wages in crafts 15.434 3 423 0.000
Central government grants 1.399 3 423 0.243
Tax revenues 3.571 3 423 0.014
Subsidies 2.611 3 423 0.051
Employment in municipal administration 33.079 3 423 0.000
Expenditures for employees and material costs 0.926 3 423 0.428
Expenditures for housing 6.298 3 423 0.000
Expenditures for environmental protection 12.118 3 423 0.000
Expenditures for education 15.663 3 423 0.000
Expenditures for religion, culture and recreation 4.401 3 423 0.005
Expenditures for social protection 2.396 3 423 0.068
Note: *Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across 
groups.
Source: Authors calculation
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Table A3: Levene’s Test* of Equality of Error Variances, municipalities by political 
party of the mayor
Variable F df1 df2 Sig.
Population 5.421 3 423 0.001
Entrepreneurial revenue per employee 1.242 3 423 0.294
Entrepreneurial revenue per inhabitant 7.592 3 423 0.000
Entrepreneurship 6.661 3 423 0.000
Employment to population ratio incorporated sector 3.773 3 423 0.011
Net profit 0.299 3 423 0.826
Net profit - dummy variable 0.971 3 423 0.406
Budget balance 0.646 3 423 0.586
Budget balance – dummy variable 1.310 3 423 0.271
Indebtedness 2.174 3 423 0.090
Indebtedness – dummy variable 20.018 3 423 0.000
Net wages in incorporated sector 1.783 3 423 0.150
Net wages in crafts 3.619 3 423 0.013
Central government grants 2.406 3 423 0.067
Tax revenues 1.639 3 423 0.180
Subsidies 0.824 3 423 0.481
Employment in municipal administration 2.375 3 423 0.070
Expenditures for employees and material costs 0.226 3 423 0.878
Expenditures for housing 5.877 3 423 0.001
Expenditures for environmental protection 5.859 3 423 0.001
Expenditures for education 5.695 3 423 0.001
Expenditures for religion, culture and recreation 8.391 3 423 0.000
Expenditures for social protection 2.849 3 423 0.037
Note: *Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across 
groups.
Source: Authors calculation
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